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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present a novel modelization and visualization
approach for heterogeneous sources of data. We represent our data
by using a model inspired by STIX. Then, we use clustering algo-
rithms to select interesting information to explore in a visualization
panel. The visualization is based on a 3D graph representation that
highlights the link between malicious event and allows to focus on
relevant security artifacts. We illustrate our approach with two case
studies using datasets containing network capture of the wannacry
attack.
Index Terms: C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Net-
work Operations—network management, network monitoring;
1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber analysts investigate incidents by correlating heterogeneous
pieces of information coming from multiple sources. In this paper,
we propose a visual tool that helps cyber analysts exhibit relations
between the security-related events and more specifically events
from the logs produced by the various sources in the monitored
system.
To that end, we build a graph-based modelization of security
data to emphasize the relations between them. Then, we partition
our graph nodes into clusters. This allows to select suspicious
clusters and to present a relevant visualization of the data items. The
visualization is interactive in order to help navigation in the data
graphs.
This paper is structured as follows. First, we present the data
sources in Section 2 and the data model in Section 3. Section 4 and 5
describe how nodes are automatically merged and clustered. Section
5 presents the prototype and the design choices we made. Section
7 shows the interest of our approach on real world examples. Our
approach is discussed and future works are presented in section 8.
Related works are identified in section 9.
2 DATA SOURCES
Cyber analysts have to discover malicious events, establish their
criticality and rebuild the global attack scenarios based on large
amounts of raw information having little a priori relations between
them. While very heterogeneous, the data sources at hand can be
split into three categories: static internal sources, dynamic internal
sources and external sources.
Static Internal Sources constitute the static description of the su-
pervised infrastructure. They are used to grasp the attacks criticality
and to have an overview of the internal system. We can for exam-
ple cite the network cartography, operating systems and software
versions, criticality of the infrastructure, internal incident reports.
Dynamic Internal Sources represent the system state in real-time.
They constitute the traces of the activity in the monitored system.
Examples are Intrusion Detection System (IDS) logs, firewall logs,
system logs, application logs and network captures.
External Data Sources are used to correlate the internal events
with known attacks. We can cite for example, Indicator of Com-
promise (IOC) databases such as OTX [1] or MISP [3], Common
Vulnerability Exploit(CVE) Databases [12], external incidents re-
ports, malware database, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) rules
like Emerging Threat Rules [4] and hardware and software editor
security reports. These pieces of data can be matched with the items
present in dynamic internal sources.
The diversity of cybersecurity sources is an asset but also a chal-
lenge. Indeed, multiple sources make it easier to correlate the infor-
mation but the heterogeneity of the data and the diversity of their
respective formats require to first build a model representing all the
inputs. In our experiments, and without loss of generality, we used
two log families as an input : logs coming from the Bro IDS [15]
and IOCs from the OTX database.
3 A MODEL INSPIRED BY STIX
Several formats have been proposed to represent cyber security
data such as OpenIOC [11], Structured Threat Information eXpres-
sion [14] or Cyber Observable eXpression (CybOX) [13].
Structured Threat Information Expression (STIXv2) is a language
used to exchange Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI). It is graph-based
in the sense that it describes the information as a connected graph.
STIX domain objects define the graph nodes and STIX relationships
define the edges. A relation is a link between STIX Objects that
describes the way in which the objects are related. Most relations
are represented using STIX Relationship Objects (SROs), while
other embedded relationships are represented as ID references. This
graph-based language allows for flexible, modular, structured, and
consistent representations of CTI.
We chose the STIXv2 language because of its comprehensiveness
compared to other models. It can represent a whole campaign of
attack but also the targets, the threat actors, the tools used, the
vulnerabilities exploited and the responses to the incident where
other languages describe only parts of them. Another advantage is
that it is based on a graph schema which allows us to apply to the
graph mining techniques that will be detailed later.
While STIXv2 is mainly used to exchange attack components
information, we use it to describe what happened in our system.
We focused on three types of STIX objects: Observed Data that
describes what was seen in the information system, Indicator that
describes an artifact that was part of an attack and Campaign that
describes a set of related malicious activities or attacks. We also used
the following CyBOX objects included in STIXv2 to represent our
items: Domain Name, File, IP Address, DNS Query, Network
Connection, Socket Address, Hostname and Port.
In our experiments, we used two logs families as an input : logs
coming from the Bro IDS [15] and IOCs from the OTX database.
Each Bro log is parsed to get valuable items that can be related to
an IOC. Each log correspond to an Observed Data. Figures 1, 2,
3 and 4 describe the objects and relationships extracted from the
various log files. Each figure describes the object and relationships
for one event from the log files. The object will become the nodes
of our graph and the relationships the vertices.
Figure 1: Objects and Relationships extracted from Bro logs conn.log
Figure 2: Objects and Relationships extracted from Bro logs dns.log
Figure 3: Objects and Relationships extracted from Bro logs files.log
While many IOC are available, we decide to focus on Domain,
Hostname, IPv4, IPv6 and FileHash as security elements because
they can all be found in our Bro logs and can easily be matched
with the CybOX objects from our model. For each IOC, we seek
in the object build from our logs if we have a match and we create
an Indicator object and a relationship between the Indicator
created and the object. The global description of our model is shown
in figure 5.
4 MERGING NODE
Given that some observed data share some common aspects (same
source address, same destination port, etc.), some objects corre-
sponding to the same observed data are present multiple times in our
logs. To create relations between observed data, we delete all but
one instance each object and translate all the relations targeting or
coming from all the identical instances of this object to the one we
keep.
As an illustration, we can consider what happens when merging a
connection log and an notice log. The notice log shares the attributes
connection uid, source address, destination address, source port
and destination port with the connection log. The automatic merg-
ing operation therefore deletes the objects Network Connection,
Socket , Address, Port created from the alert log and link the ob-
ject Indicator to the object Network Connection of the connection
log. We can view the result in figure 6.
In a traditional data model, security items would have been rep-
resented as object attributes which force to search in all objects
to retrieve one artifact. The advantage of this representation is to
focus on one particular object and directly see all the objects that are
related to it.
5 CLUSTERING
In our proposal, since we have no a priori information about the
observed data, all relations are considered equals and no weight
is applied to the links. The Louvain algorithm [2] is a method to
extract clusters from large networks. It maximizes the modularity
function in a partition. In other words, it ensures that the number of
links (since all links have the same weight) are more important in
the partition than between the partitions.
Figure 4: Objects and Relationships extracted from Bro logs notice.log
We apply this algorithm to our graph. Once the clusters are
built, we declare IOC and the NIDS alerts as values of interest.
The clusters containing such value of interest are selected to appear
in the representation since they are actually exploitable. At this
point all clusters are disjoint. We search all direct links between the
selected clusters in the initial graph to help the analyst to see if there
is a relevant relation between two points of interest located in two
different clusters and create these links so as to group the clusters
that can be grouped.
Depending on the attack, the importance of each relation could
vary. We let the analyst investigate on the importance of each link
according to its semantic and make an interpretation of it.
6 PROTOTYPE
In this section, we present our prototype. We first describe the
application architecture. Then, we present the design choices we
made. Finally, we present the various interactions the analyst can
have with the tool.
6.1 Application Architecture
Our prototype is made of four elements. The data collection and
modelization module collects data from multiple sources and parse
them into parameters. Objects and Relationships derived from these
parameters are then created, merged and integrated in a Graph DB
database that allow simple and fast retrieval of complex hierarchical
structures that are difficult to model in relational databases. Then,
the clustering module extracts the nodes which are points of interest.
Finally, the visualization interface displays the elected clusters and
allows interactions with the user to ease exploration.
6.2 Design
In our early experiments, we first tried to generate 2D graphs rep-
resentations. However, we had to deal with the fact that numerous
lines were crossing one another and that this representation was very
difficult to understand. As a consequence, we decided to create 3D
graphs representations using Unity [17] even if we were aware of
the the well-known occultation problem they can cause.
In our representation, nodes of the graph are represented as
colored sphere. Each color represents a class object : red for
Campaign, yellow for Indicator, blue for IP Address, violet
for Socket Address, rosa for Network Connection, purple for
Port, turquoise blue for Domain, ligth turquoise blue for DNS
Query, white for Observed Data and black for File. The palette
used is designed for being used by color-blind persons [10].
We used a force-directed graph drawing algorithm to generate
our representations [8]. This algorithm assigns forces among the set
of edges and the set of nodes, according to their relative positions
and then uses these forces to simulate the motion of the nodes and
edges. Once the forces on the nodes and edges of a graph have
been defined, the behaviour of the entire graph is simulated as if it
was a physical system: the forces are applied to the nodes, pulling
them closer together or pushing them further apart. This is repeated
iteratively until the system comes to a mechanical equilibrium state,
i.e. when their relative positions do not change anymore from one
iteration to the next. As a result, all the edges are of more or less
equal length and there are as few crossing edges as possible [9].
Figures 7 and 8 show examples of generated representations. First
of all, our proposal allows the operator to easily compare the relative
Figure 5: Modelization of the security elements
Figure 6: Objects and Relationships fusioned between conn.log et
notice.log
density of different parts of the graph as well as to see if a point of
interest is involved in a lot of events. Some specific patterns can
also be easily identified. For instance, the ”furball” on Figure 7
allows the analyst to see easily that the value of interest in the center
was involved in a lot of events (in this case, this is port TCP 445).
Finally, our proposal also allows to follow a potential propagation
by finding a path between objects. We have to underline here that
links in the graph have very various semantics and therefore that the
solution leaves the analyst interpret them freely (while still being
able to veryfing in the log files for the specific meaning of each of
them). While this could be hazardous, our early experiments showed
that it allowed a more ”open-minded” exploration by analysts.
We also took advantage of the features of Unity to allow the
analyst to navigate the data. He or she can zoom and move around
the data. The analyst can also click on any node to obtain more
information on the related point of interest. Finaly, the analyst can
also create new nodes and links in order to enrich the data and
answer to “What-if” question.
7 CASE STUDY
In this case study, we use two datasets made of logs from Bro
IDS that were generated in the Stratosphere Labs [5] as part of
the Malware Capture Facility Project in CVUT University, Prague,
Czech Republic. The objective of this project is to store long-lived
real botnet traffic and to generate labeled netflows files. Table 1
summarizes the objects and relations extracted from the datasets.
7.1 Wannacry dataset 1
The CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnets-252-1 dataset describes the
wannacry attack. The capture lasted 501 seconds. Bro output files
were generated from this capture. The infected host is 192.168.1.120.
The ransomware connected to the killswitch domain during the cap-
ture. It did not encrypt files but tried to infect other computers. 5174
connections were logged in Bro files. There were 8 DNS requests
Table 1: Objects and Relationships extracted from the datasets
Object & Relationship Wannacry 1 Wannacry 2
Address 4969 14373
AttackCampaign 1 6
DNSQuery 8 16
Domain 3 3
File 0 7
Indicator 1 3
NetworkConnection 5174 15298
ObservedData 5174 15298
Port 4944 10540
SocketAddress 9935 24999
Total Objects 30209 80543
Total Relationships 35418 95948
including 4 requests to the killswitch domain.
In the visualization of the selected clusters in figure 7, we can
see on the left the representation of the address scan on port 445/tcp.
This port is represented at the middle. On the right of the graph, the
IOC representing the killswitch is linked with other objects from its
clusters.
Our visualization was able to select 616 interesting nodes out
of 30209 and 642 interesting edges out of 35418. The generated
representation shows the scan and allows the operator to focus on
object highly related to the IOC detected in the data. We investigated
why two separated graphs were generated. Looking at the raw logs,
we discovered that the DNS request was made by an IPv6 address
whereas the scan came from an IPv4 address and was targeting IPv4
addresses.
7.2 Wannacry dataset 2
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnets-253-1 also describes a wannacry
attack. This time due to a problem in the DNS server provider,
the domain did not resolved to an IP and therefore the infection
went on. The capture lasted 895 seconds. The infected host was
192.168.1.120. This capture used a mitm proxy on all TLS ports and
a redirection to a honeypot on port 445/tcp.
In this capture, thanks to our proposal, we detect the killswitch
www.ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com.
We also discover two malicious addresses, 193.23.244.244 and
81.30.158.223 that are associated to the wannacry campaign. The
representation also shows a scan on port 445/tcp. We focus in Figure
8 on clusters with the killswitch and IOCs. In the visualization we
can see that the point of interest are concentrated on three clusters.
The first one concentrates two alerts and one IOC referring to an
Figure 7: Representation of selected clusters in dataset 1
Figure 8: Representation of selected clusters in dataset 2
IP Address, the second concentrates 3 alerts and one IOC, also
referring to an IP Address. The last one, but also the more dense
contains only one IOC, the killswitch. This domain is directly
linked with 9 DNSResquest. By following paths sourcing from the
malicious DNS request, two more DNS request coming from the
same socket can be identified.
8 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our proposal allows the analyst to explore the data and to interpret
results. He or she can see the object shared between two logs and
try to rebuild an attack chain. The objects selected are relevant and
can direct the operator for his or her first analysis. Some pattern can
be recognized such as the scan or a conversation between two IP
addresses on the same port.
Some limitations coming from the clusters selection remain. In-
deed, the clusters created by the Louvain algorithm are disjointed:
an object can not belong to two clusters and links between clusters
are suppressed. As we select only interesting clusters (i.e. clusters
for which we have at least one IOC), we can lose some interesting
object present in a cluster that was not selected. To avoid this, we
can introduce the notion of “bridge node” that is to say nodes from
which we can go to another cluster even if it is not selected. The
second point of evolution is the scalability. We made visualization
for bro logs and IOC in our case study. The next step is to integrate
other types of data and try our model on bigger datasets.
9 RELATED WORKS
Other work have addressed exploration of IDS alerts. Among them,
[16] proposes to build an automated multi-stage log-based intrusion
analysis through the use of community discovery algorithms. The
tool, named HERCULE, builds multi-dimensional weighted graphs
by correlating log entries. Our work split the log entries within
multiple objects and put all the semantic on the object and not on
the relation. By contrast, our proposal also includes external sources
such as IOC and proposes a visual representation for exploration.
Force-directed graphs have also been used previously for security
purposes. In [6], the authors propose to visualize network traffic
using force-directed graph drawing techniques. Data points are
connected by times, displaying sequences of events with similar
characteristics. The simulation is based on one type of log: fire-
wall logs. Our proposal, by contrasts, establishes relation between
heterogeneous sources of data.
Finally, an other proposal was made to correlate heterogeneous
data sources. In [7] for instance, the authors designed a security-
oriented log visualization tool, CORGI, that allows security experts
to visually explore and link numerous types of log files through
multiple representations.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a new tool that allows operators to explore
security data. It is based on a graph representation of attributes
coming from heterogeneous sources and notably Threat Intelligence.
The visualization highlights the relations between security elements
and malicious event or IOC. It gives a starting point for the analysts
to explore the data and rebuild an attack scenario by following
the links between the nodes. We demonstrated the interest of this
visualization using two datasets containing network captures of the
wannacry attack.
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